Limitations in the cross vulnerabilities (people, property, environment) to optimize task prioritization and decision making.
Limits in the ability to ensure a common understanding of the information exchanged ( , symbology) by all managers involved in the operations
Shortcomings in policy and procedures for communicating with the public during a large .
Shortcomings in the ability to exchange -related information among agencies and organizations (also related to as )
Lack of common procedures supporting international cooperation in aerial firefighting.
Insufficiencies in the management of spontaneous volunteers on the scene in terms of location, tasking, capabilities, and shift duration.
Lack of effective public warning system with the ability to verify whether the information reached the recipient.
Insufficient understanding of the overall current and planned efforts as well current strategies across organizations during a
Lack of mutual knowledge or alignment of operational needs and procedures between different organizations responding to the same .
Limitations in the ability to model real-time ( phase) or pre-event ( phase) dynamics of the chemical and radiological threat and visualization of obtained results in a form that can be used directly by the incident commander.
Limits in the ability to merge and synthesise disparate data sources and models in real time (historic events, spreading models, tactical situation, critical assets map, etc) to support incident commander decision making.
Insufficiency in the ability to report dangerous areas and situation overview from multiple and non-traditional sources (e.g. crowdsourcing and social media) into operations.
Lack of a “Common Operational Picture” environment to integrate data sources and calculation results from different models crucial for decision making process from the perspective of the incident commander